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Abstract
Elections and opinion polls often have many candidates, with the aim to either rank the
candidates or identify a small set of winners according to voters’ preferences. In practice, voters
do not provide a full ranking; instead, each voter provides their favoriteK candidates, potentially
in ranked order. The election organizer must choose K and an aggregation rule.
We provide a theoretical framework to make these choices. Each K-Approval or K-partial
ranking mechanism (with a corresponding positional scoring rule) induces a learning rate for the
speed at which the election recovers the asymptotic outcome. Given the voter choice distribution,
the election planner can thus identify the rate optimal mechanism. Earlier work in this area
provides coarse order-of-magnitude guaranties which are not sufficient to make such choices.
Our framework further resolves questions of when randomizing between multiple mechanisms
may improve learning for arbitrary voter noise models.
Finally, we use data from 5 large participatory budgeting elections that we organized across
several US cities, along with other ranking data, to demonstrate the utility of our methods.
In particular, we find that historically such elections have set K too low and that picking the
right mechanism can be the difference between identifying the ultimate winner with only a 80%
probability or a 99.9% probability after 400 voters.
1 Introduction
Elections and opinion polls with many candidates and multiple winners are common. In partic-
ipatory budgeting (PB), for example, people directly determine a part of the government’s bud-
get (Alo´s-Ferrer and Granic´, 2012; Goel et al., 2016). These elections often contain many candidate
projects (up to 70, cf. Gelauff et al. (2018)) and only a few thousand voters, with potentially mil-
lions of dollars on the line (Public Agenda, 2016). Similarly, polls may compare tens of candidates
and yet only sample hundreds of voters.
Unfortunately, the number of voters required to recover the asymptotic ranking or set of winners
often scales, potentially exponentially, with the number of candidates (Caragiannis and Micha,
2017). Thus with many candidates, it is essential to use a voting mechanism that most efficiently
elicits information from each voter.
In this work, we analyze positional scoring rules (de Borda, 1781; Young, 1975), mechanisms
in which each position in each voter’s personal ranking maps to a score given to the candidate
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that occupies that position. We focus on the special cases of such rules implied by K-Approval
elicitation, in which each voter is asked to select their favorite K candidates, as they the most
commonly used such mechanisms in practice. Section 3 formalizes our model. Then:
Section 4. For a given election, we show how the particular scoring rule used affects the rate at
which the final outcome (asymptotic in the number of voters) is learned. These rates, based
on large deviation bounds, extend and tighten the results of Caragiannis and Micha (2017),
and are precise enough to determine, for example, which of 3-Approval and 4-Approval is
better in a particular context. We focus on the goals of learning both a ranking over all
candidates and identifying a subset of winners.
Section 5.1. Leveraging these rates, we study when randomization between scoring rules can
improve learning, extending previous results to general positional scoring rules, the goal of
selecting a set of winners, and arbitrary noise models. In particular, we find that randomizing
between scoring rules can never speed up learning, for arbitrary noise models. This contrasts
to the case when one is restricted to K-Approval mechanisms.
Section 5.2. For the Mallows model, we study how the optimal K in K-Approval scales with the
noise parameter, the number of candidates, and the number of winners desired. We find that,
in contrast to design choices made in practice, one should potentially ask voters to identify
their favorite half of candidates, even if the goal is to identify a single winner.
Section 6. We apply our approach to experimental ballots attached to real participatory budgeting
elections across several US cities, as well as other ranking data from a host of domains. We
find that the exact mechanism used matters: in one setting, for example, asking voters to
identify their favorite candidate results in only a 80% chance of identifying the best candidate
after 400 voters, while asking voters for their favorite 2 candidates identifies the same best
candidate 99.9% of the time. Extending our theoretical insights, we find that, historically
across elections, K has been set too low for effective learning. We further identify real-world
examples in which randomization would have sped up learning.
Our work bridges a gap between coarse theoretical analyses of voting rules and the fine-grained
design questions a practitioner wishes to answer. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related work
Our work is part of several strands of research on mechanisms that elicit peoples’ preferences. Ag-
gregating voter rankings has a long history (de Borda, 1781; marquis de Condorcet, 1785; Copeland,
1951; Kemeny, 1959; Young, 1988).
Learning properties of voting rules. Most related are works that study the learning properties
of voting rules, assuming that a “true” ranking. One approach is to specify a noise model under
which voter preferences are drawn (e.g., Mallows, Plackett-Luce) and then derive error rates by
the number of voters for maximum likelihood or similar estimators under the model (Maystre and
Grossglauser, 2015; Zhao, Piech, and Xia, 2016; Lu and Boutilier, 2011; Guiver and Snelson, 2009;
Procaccia and Shah, 2015; de Weerdt, Gerding, and Stein, 2016; Chierichetti and Kleinberg, 2014).
Caragiannis, Procaccia, and Shah (2013) ask similar questions to us: under what voter noise
models do certain voting rules asymptotically recover the true underlying ranking, and how quickly
do they do so. They define a class of voting rules and voter noise models under which a “true”
ranking of candidates is eventually recovered. They further show that for a subset of this class
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(that does not contain positional scoring rules) and under the Mallows model, only a number of
voters that is logarithmic in the number of candidates is required, where each voter provides a
full ranking. Lee et al. (2014) develop an algorithm that can approximate the Borda rule, given a
number of comparisons by each voter that is logarithmic in the number of candidates.
Most similar is that of Caragiannis and Micha (2017). They show that under the Mallows model,
K-Approval with any fixed K takes exponentially many voters (in the number of candidates) to
recover the underlying ranking; on the other hand, K-approval with K chosen uniformly at random
for each voter takes only a polynomial number of voters.
These works provide order estimates for the learning rate, asymptotic in the number of candi-
dates; fine-grained differentiation between different rules or K-Approval mechanisms for a given
election is not possible. We provide the latter and show that it matters.
Other approaches to comparing mechanisms. Many works take an axiomatic and computa-
tional approach, comparing mechanisms that may produce different outcomes even given asymptot-
ically many votes (Fishburn and Gehrlein, 1976; Fishburn, 1978; Staring, 1986; Tataru and Merlin,
1997; Wiseman, 2000; Ratliff, 2003; Elkind et al., 2017; Aziz et al., 2015; Caragiannis et al., 2017;
Aziz et al., 2017; Lackner and Skowron, 2018a,b; Faliszewski and Talmon, 2018). Caragiannis et al.
(2019) for example show how to find a scoring rule that most agrees with a given partial ground
truth ranking. In contrast, we compare mechanisms’ learning rates under a condition (formalized
in Section 3.2) in which they produce the same asymptotic outcome.
Benade et al. (2018) and Gelauff et al. (2018) experimentally compare different mechanisms
across several dimensions, including ease of use and consistency with another mechanism; the
latter leverages data from a participatory budgeting election at a university.
Large deviation analysis of elicitation mechanisms. Theoretically, we leverage large de-
viation rates and Chernoff bounds to derive how quickly a given scoring rule learns its outcome;
see work of Dembo and Zeitouni (2010) for an introduction to large deviations. This work is thus
conceptually similar to work on elicitation design for rating systems (Garg and Johari, 2018, 2019).
In those works, the authors derive large deviation-based learning rates that depend on the questions
that are asked to buyers as they review an item, where the goal is to accurately rank items; they
further run an experiment on an online labor platform. In that setting, however, buyers rate a
single item, and mechanisms are distinct based on the behavior they induce; in this work, voters
see all the candidates and provide a partial ordering, and different designs (e.g., 3-Approval vs
4-Approval) constrain the types of orderings voters can provide.
3 Model
We now present our model and a condition under which different positional scoring rules induce
the same asymptotic outcome.
3.1 Model primitives
We begin with the model primitives: candidates and voters, the election goal, and elicitation and
aggregation.
Candidates and Voters. There is a set of M candidates C = {1, . . . ,M}, typically indexed by
i, j ∈ C. There are N voters V = {1, . . . , N}. Each voter v ∈ V has a strict ranking of candidates
σv, drawn independently and identically from probability mass function over strict rankings F (σ).
Let i σ j denote that i is preferred over j in σ, and σ(i) = k denote that candidate i is in the kth
position in σ.
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A special case for F is the Mallows model (Mallows, 1957), in which there is a “true” societal
preference σ∗ from which each voter’s ranking is a noisy sample. In particular,
FMallows(σ) ∝ φd(σ,σ∗)
Where d(σ, σ∗) is the Kendall’s τ distance between rankings σ, σ∗, and φ ∈ [0, 1] is the noise
parameter: the smaller it is, the more concentrated F is around σ∗.
Election goal. We assume that the goal G is to divide the candidates into T disjoint, ordered tiers
G = {C1, . . . , CT }, such that C = ∪Tt=1Ct, where candidate i ∈ Cs is deemed societally preferable
over j ∈ Ct if s < t. The size of each tier is fixed before the election. For example, recovering a
strict ranking over all candidates corresponds to G = {C1, . . . , CM}, where |Ct| = 1. Alternatively,
identifying a set of W winners, without distinguishing amongst the winners, corresponds to G =
{C1, C2}, with |C1| = W .
In the main text and especially the empirics, we will focus on the task of selecting W winners
as it is the most common task in practice. However, this general notation allows comparison of
the learning properties of different settings, and for example ask how much more expensive is it
(in terms of the number of voters needed) to identify a strict ranking as opposed to just a set of
winners.
Elicitation and Aggregation. Voters vote using an elicitation mechanism. Their votes are then
aggregated using a positional scoring rule, parameterized as β : {1, . . . ,M} 7→ R. We consider the
following mechanisms:
K-Ranking Voter v ranks her favorite K candidates, i.e., reveals {(i, σv(i)) : σv(i) ≤ K}. Candi-
date i then receives a score siv = β(σv(i)) if ranked, 0 otherwise. For example, β(k) = M − k
for the Borda count.1
K-Approval Voter v selects her favorite K candidates, i.e., reveals {i : σv(i) ≤ K}. A candidate
receives a score siv = 1 for being selected, 0 otherwise.
β encodes both elicitation and aggregation. For example, K-Approval is equivalent to K-
ranking with score function β(k) = I[k ≤ K]. Furthermore, note that given K-ranking data, one
can simulate K ′-ranking elicitation for K ′ ≤ K with a β s.t. β(k) = 0 for k > K ′.
The scoring rule β is a design choice made by the election organizer, and so we will refer to
β as the election’s design. We restrict ourselves to non-constant, non-increasing scoring rules, i.e.,
β ∈ B = {β : ∀k < ` ∈ 1, . . . ,M, β(k) ≥ β(`), and ∃k < `, β(k) > β(`)}.
Outcome. After N voters, candidate i’s cumulative score is sNi =
1
N
∑N
v=1 siv. Candidates are
ranked in descending order of score, to form ranking σN , with ties broken uniformly at random. We
denote the outcome after N voters, corresponding to the goal G, as ON (M,F, β,G). For example,
for the goal of selecting W winners, ON (M,F, β,G) is simply the top W candidates in σN . When
(M,F, β,G) is clear from context, we will refer to the outcome as ON .
As the number of voters N → ∞, candidate scores sNi → EF [siv] , si by the law of large
numbers; when such expected scores are distinct, i.e., si 6= sj for i 6= j, then σN → σ∗ for some
ranking σ∗. However, note that there may exist an asymptotic outcome ON → O∗ even without
an asymptotic ranking σN → σ∗, as long as expected scores si and goal G are such that candidates
with identical expected scores are sorted into the same tier.
1In Borda, candidates not ranked receive a score (M − K − 1)/2, consistent with assuming they are all tied in
position (K + 1).
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3.2 Asymptotic design invariance
The asymptotic outcome O∗ of an election may vary with the scoring rule β. For example, there
may be a different winner if voters are asked to identify their favorite two candidates than if they
identify their single favorite candidate, if the winner in the latter case is a polarizing candidate.
As an axiomatic comparison between outcomes is out of the scope of this paper, we restrict our
attention to cases where all “reasonable” choices of different β asymptotically result in the same
outcome (where “reasonable” corresponds to the set of scoring rules B defined above).
Definition 1. A setting (M,F ) is asymptotically design-invariant for goal G if any reasonable β
induces the same outcome asymptotically. ∃O∗ : ∀β ∈ B,
lim
N→∞
ON (M,F, β,G) = O∗, with probability 1
Such design invariance only occurs under a fairly strong condition on the voter preference
distribution: that the candidates can be separated into tiers (according to goal G) such that
candidates in higher tiers are strictly more likely to be ranked by a voter in the top k positions, for
all k < M , than are candidates in lower tiers.
Proposition 1. A setting (M,F ) for goal G is asymptotically design-invariant if and only if there
exist candidate tiers O∗ = {C∗1 . . . C∗T } (corresponding to G) s.t. ∀s < t: i ∈ C∗s , j ∈ C∗t =⇒
PrF (σv(i) ≤ k) > PrF (σv(j) ≤ k), ∀k ∈ {1 . . .M − 1}.
Note that this condition is stronger than stochastic dominance as the inequality is strict for
every position k.
This proposition connects to Caragiannis, Procaccia, and Shah (2013) as follows: they prove
that many rules (including all positional scoring rules and the Bucklin rule) asymptotically recover
the base ranking σ∗ of a generalization of the Mallows model in which the probability F (σ) of a
ranking σ is monotonic in the distance d(σ, σ∗), where distance function d is itself in some general
class that contains the Kendall’s τ distance. Their results directly imply that such noise models,
including the standard Mallows model, are asymptotically design-invariant for any goal G.
However, for goals G where recovering a full ranking is unnecessary, the condition in Propo-
sition 1 is weaker than the assumptions of Caragiannis, Procaccia, and Shah (2013); there need
not even be a single base ranking σ∗. For example, when G such that we wish to select a set of
W winners, F corresponding to a mixture of Mallows models – with all possible permutations of
the W candidates in the top W positions in the base rankings – would still be design-invariant.
Constructing a general class of ranking noise models that satisfies this property is an avenue for
future work.
Assuming asymptotic design-invariance on voter preferences F may seem restrictive. However,
absent axioms – that are precise enough for design purposes – to prefer one scoring rule β over
another, the assumption allows us to proceed in a principled manner. We believe it is unlikely
that such precise, satisfactory axioms exist generally. In the Appendix, we provide a simple ex-
ample (similar to that of Staring (1986)) where 1-Approval and 2-Approval select disjoint sets of
2-Winners, and such examples can be adapted more generally to selecting W winners from either
K-Approvals or K ′-Approvals. In participatory budgeting with the goal of identifying 6-10 win-
ning projects out of over twenty projects, it is unclear whether there is a principled reason to prefer
4-Approval over 8-Approval. However, such axioms would be an interesting avenue for future work.
Furthermore, in Section 6.2 we show that design invariance is often approximately satisfied
in practice, especially for identifying a small set of winners, using data from a wide range of
participatory budgeting and other elections.
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4 Learning Rates and Optimal Design
Different elicitation and aggregation mechanisms may take different amounts of voters to learn the
asymptotic outcome. For example, suppose we want to identify the worst candidate out of 100,
where the voter’s rankings are drawn from a Mallows model with φ > 0. Then, asking each voter
to identify their single favorite candidate will eventually identify the worst candidate, but after
many more voters than if we ask each voter to identify their least favorite candidate. We make
such learning rates precise in this section. Our results in this section extend those of Caragiannis
and Micha (2017) as discussed above, both to arbitrary positional scoring rules and by providing
tighter bounds for how a scoring rule affects the convergence rate. These rates are precise enough
to design scoring rules, for example comparing 4-Approval and 8-Approval in the above example.
4.1 Learning rates
We begin by deriving rates for how quickly a given positional scoring rule β learns its asymptotic
outcome O∗ (given it exists), as a function of the voter preference model F . In particular, we use
large deviation rates at which a scoring rule learns (Dembo and Zeitouni, 2010).
Definition 2. Consider a sequence {AN ≥ 0}N∈N, where AN → 0 . Value r > 0 is the large
deviation rate for AN if
r = − lim
N→∞
1
N
logAN
When r > 0 exists, AN → 0 exponentially fast, with exponent r asymptotically, i.e., AN is
e−rN±o(N). These rates provide us both upper and lower bounds for the probability of an error or
the number of errors in an outcome after N voters, up to polynomial factors. In particular, in the
propositions below, we will calculate the large deviation rate of errors in the outcome. We will also
then provide (loose) upper bounds for such errors after N voters that hold without any missing
polynomial factors, for any N . These upper bounds are equivalent to Chernoff bounds.
The particular forms for these rates, derived below for general noise models F , may seem com-
plex. However, they are useful both for theoreticians and practitioners. For example, in Section 5.1,
we use the structure of such rates to resolve open questions regarding when randomization between
mechanisms can help learn the outcome from votes drawn from an arbitrary noise model. In Sec-
tion 6, we show that learning rates – even when empirically calculated – reflect the true behavior of
errors in real elections with a small number of voters; we then use empirically calculated learning
rates to draw design insights across elections.
Rates for separating two candidates. We now derive the large deviation learning rates for
recovering the true ordering between a pair of candidates i, j, given noise model F . These rates
will directly translate to the learning rate for the overall election, given some goal G.
Proposition 2. Fix scoring rule β ∈ B, voter distribution F , and consider candidates i, j such
that si > sj. Then, the probability of making a mistake in ranking these two candidates after N
voters, Pr(σN (i) > σN (j)), goes to zero with large deviation rate
rij(β) = − inf
z∈R
logEF [exp (z (β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))))]
Further, the following upper bound holds for any N .
Pr(σN (i) > σN (j)) ≤ exp(−rij(β)N)
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The proof follows directly from writing a random variable for the event of making a mistake
after N voters and then applying known large deviation rates. This simplicity emerges because
positional scoring rules are additive across voters.
The proposition establishes that – for a fixed number of candidates M and voter noise model F
– the probability of making a mistake on any single pair of candidates i, j decreases exponentially
with the number of voters, at a rate governed by the scoring rule β and the candidates’ relative
probabilities of appearing at each position of a voter’s preference ranking. The rate rij(β) is non-
negative, and and larger values correspond to faster learning of the relative ranking of i, j. Note
that for notational convenience, we suppress F in the argument for the rate.
For general β, we cannot find a closed form for rij(β). However, the structure of this rate, in
particular that of the argument in the log(·), will directly let us show that randomization cannot
help learning outcomes among positional scoring rules, for arbitrary noise models F .
For K-Approval voting, further, the rate simplifies.
Proposition 3. Consider β consistent with K-Approval voting for some fixed K, and candidates
i, j such that si > sj. Then the large deviation rate rij(β) in Proposition 2 is
rij(K) = − log
(
2
√
tiij(K)t
j
ij(K) + 1− tiij(K)− tjij(K)
)
Where tiij(K) , PrF (σv(i) ≤ K,σv(j) > K), i.e., the probability that a voter approves i but not j.
The proof follows directly from the structure of β for K-Approval, β(k) = I[k ≤ K]; for each
pair of candidates, the sufficient statistics are how often each candidate appears in a voter’s top K
list but the other candidate does not.
We overload notation and use K directly in the argument for rij(K). This rate function rij(K)
is convex in the probabilities tiij(K), t
j
ij(K); this fact will let us show that randomization, even
among K-Approval mechanisms, cannot help learning the relationship of any pair of candidates.
Rates for learning the outcome. In general, the rates at which one learns each pair of
candidates immediately translate to rates for learning the entire outcome O∗.
Proposition 4. Consider goal G and β ∈ B such that ON → O∗. Let QN be the expected number
of errors in the outcome after N voters,
∑
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t Pr(σ
N (i) > σN (j)). Then QN goes to zero
with large deviation rate
r(β) = min
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
rij(β)
Further, the following upper bound holds for any N .
QN ≤M2 exp(−rN)
The large deviation rate r(β) thus provides a tight characterization for how many voters it takes
to (with high confidence) recover the asymptotic outcome of an election. Note that the goal plays
an important role: for selecting W winners, for example, it is not important to learn the exact
relationship among candidates {1, . . . ,W}, speeding up outcome learning. Design β also matters;
e.g., even amongst approval voting mechanisms, K = 1 vs K = 5 will produce substantially different
tiij(K). To derive learning rates for K-Approval for any given noise model or using real-world data,
one simply needs to calculate these values. We do so numerically for the Mallows model and
empirically with real world data in Sections 5.2 and 6, respectively.
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Figure 1: K-Approval rate optimal mechanism for the Mallows model as φ, number of candidates,
and number of winners vary.
4.2 Optimal design and discussion
Now that we can quantify how quickly a given scoring rule β learns its asymptotic outcome, we
apply our framework to designing elections, i.e., choosing an optimal scoring rule β. For the rest
of this work, we assume that the setting (M,F ) is asymptotically design-invariant for the goal G,
i.e., there exists an outcome that is asymptotically induced by every reasonable scoring rule. Then,
the design of an election β only affects the rate at which the election converges to the asymptotic
outcome O∗, as calculated above. With no other constraints, then, the design challenge is simple:
find the rate optimal β.
Definition 3. A scoring rule β∗ ∈ B is rate optimal if it maximizes the rate in Proposition 4.
K∗-Approval is Approval rate optimal if it maximizes the rate among K-Approval mechanisms.
Rate optimal designs β learn the outcome faster than others in the number of voters, and so
are preferable to other designs. What influences how quickly a design β learns?
EF [exp (z (β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))))] must be small (near zero) for negative z, and so β(k)− β(k′)
must be large when Pr(σv(i) = k, σv(j) = k
′) is large. In other words, a scoring rule must reward
a candidate achieving a position in a voter’s ranking that is only achieved by asymptotically high-
ranking candidates. For example, if it is common for worse candidates to be ranked second in a
given voter’s ranking but not to be ranked first, then β(1) β(2) would be beneficial.
Note that finding such designs requires knowledge of the voter noise model F , which in many
settings may not be available before the election. However, next in Sections 5 and 6, we show that
there are valuable insights that apply across elections, including how our approach has informed
participatory budgeting deployments.
5 Theoretical Design Insights
The learning rates derived in the previous section provide election design insights, even before our
approach is applied to real-world data. In particular, in this section, we first extend the previous
literature on the (potential) benefits of randomizing between mechanisms. Then, we study the task
of selecting W winners using K-Approval voting.
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5.1 When does randomization help?
We now consider the question of whether randomizing between mechanisms in an election may speed
up learning. By randomization, we mean: consider a set of scoring rules B = {β1, . . . , βP } ⊆ B;
elicitation and aggregation for a given voter is done according to a scoring rule picked at random
from B, where βp is selected with probability dp.
Note that the learning rate of such randomized schemes can be calculated as before, by summing
across βp inside the E[·] of rij(β) or – for B consisting only of K-Approval votes – directly through
the resulting probability that the voter approves i but not j. We use rij(B,D), r(B,D) to denote
the candidate pairwise and overall outcome learning rates, respectively, for randomized mechanism
(B,D), where B = {β1, . . . , βP } ⊆ B and D = {d1, . . . , dP }.
It is known that in some settings randomization improves learning, asymptotically in the number
of candidates. Caragiannis and Micha (2017) provide an example in which randomizing uniformly
between all possible K-Approval mechanisms outperforms any static K-Approval elicitation, when
the goal is to rank all the candidates. Their insight is that, under the Mallows model and under a
fixed K, either the first two candidates will be hard to distinguish from each other, or the last two
will, and randomizing between mechanisms balances learning each pair.
We now study randomization for the goal of selecting W winners and for arbitrary positional
scoring rules and voter noise models. Our first result is that randomizing between scoring rules
does not help, for any voter noise model, in contrast to the case when restricted to approval votes.
Theorem 1. Randomization does not improve the outcome learning rate for any asymptotically
design-invariant noise model F or goal G. For any randomized scoring rule mechanism (B,D),
where B ⊂ B, for any F , G, the scoring rule β∗(k) = ∑p dpβp(k) satisfies r(β∗) ≥ r(B,D).
The result follows from the fact that EF [exp (z (β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))))] is convex in β(k), for all
i, j, z, F . Then, given a randomization over β1, . . . βP , we can increase − infz log(·) by decreasing its
argument, by instead using the static scoring rule defined by the corresponding convex combination
of β1, . . . βP . Note that such a negative result cannot be obtained via analysis that is asymptotic
in the number of candidates; we need learning rates for a given election.
Next, we further refine the result of Caragiannis and Micha (2017), by showing that the “pivotal
pair” feature of their example – where different pairs of candidates dominate the learning rate
for different mechanisms – is key. In particular, our next result establishes, again for any noise
model, that randomization amongst K-Approval mechanisms cannot help separate any given pair
of candidates.
Theorem 2. Randomization amongst K-Approval mechanisms does not improve the learning rate
for separating a given pair of candidates i, j for any asymptotically design-invariant noise model
F or goal G. For any randomized K-Approval mechanism (B,D), where βp ∈ B corresponds to
p-Approval, for any F , G, there exists a mechanism K∗ij-Approval such that rij(K
∗
ij) ≥ rij(B,D).
The proof relies on the pairwise rate function rij(K) being convex in the approval probabilities
tiij(K), t
j
ij(K).
This theorem directly implies that, for the Mallows model, randomization among K-Approval
voting cannot speed up learning when the goal is to identify a set of W winners, as opposed to
when the goal is to rank.
Corollary 1. Randomization among K-Approval mechanisms does not improve the learning rate
for selecting W winners from the Mallows model. For any randomized K-Approval mechanism
(B,D), where βp ∈ B corresponds to p-Approval, for selecting W winners from the Mallows model,
there exists an Approval rate optimal mechanism K∗-Approval such that r(K∗) ≥ r(B,D).
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The proof simply notes that under the Mallows model with this goal, the candidate pair W,W+1
(when candidates are indexed according to reference distribution σ∗) is pivotal regardless of the
K-Approval mechanism used. This corollary does not extend to arbitrary noise models, where
randomization amongst K-approval mechanisms may improve the learning rate.
Theorem 3. Randomization among K-Approval mechanisms may improve the learning rate for
the goal of selecting W winners. There exist asymptotically design-invariant settings (M,F ) for the
goal of selecting W winners such that a randomized K-Approval mechanism (B,D), where βp ∈ B
corresponds to p-Approval, satisfies
r(B,D) > max
K
r(K)
We prove the result two ways: (1) we construct an example in which candidate h is asymptoti-
cally selected, and candidates i, j are not. Which of h  i or h  j is the pivotal pair (determines
the overall rate function) depends on the K-Approval mechanism used, and randomizing between
two mechanisms improves the overall rate; (2) perhaps more interestingly, we find many examples in
our real PB elections and other ranking data in which randomization would have sped up learning
for the task of selecting a set of winning candidates (see Section 6.4).
5.2 K-Approval for selecting W winners
One of the most common voting settings is identifying a set of W winners using K-Approval,
whether in representative democracy elections (typically K = W = 1), polling for such elections
(where the goal often is to identify the top few candidates out of many, especially in primary races),
or crowd-sourcing labels (where one wants one or a few labels for an item out of many possible
ones). Here, we study how to design such elections, i.e., how to choose the best K, i.e., the one
that maximizes the learning rate. For simplicity, we work with the Mallows model, extending the
resulting insights to real-world data in the next section.
Recall that in a Mallows model, each voter’s ranking is a noisy sample from a reference distri-
bution σ∗. With this symmetric model, one may believe that setting K = W is always optimal. For
example, when noise parameter φ = 0 and so each voter’s ranking is exactly σ∗, K = W is optimal;
in fact, any other design K 6= W fails to correctly identify the set of winners even asymptotically:
it would not distinguish among the first K candidates in σ∗ or among the last M −K candidates.
However, our next result establishes that the cases with φ > 0 are different.
Theorem 4. Under the Mallows model and the goal of selecting W winners, W -Approval may not
be Approval rate optimal.
We prove the theorem by example. To find this example and to generate the plots discussed
next, we use an efficient dynamic program to exactly calculate the joint distributions of the locations
σv(i), σv(j) of pairs of candidates i, j in a voter’s ranking, given the Mallows noise parameter; we can
then directly calculate tiij(K), t
j
ij(K) and thus the learning rate for each K-Approval mechanism.
This program leverages Mallows repeated insertion probabilities (Lu and Boutilier, 2014; Diaconis,
1988) and may be of independent interest for numerical analyses of the Mallows model.
Numerical analysis. We now numerically analyze, for the Mallows model, how the Approval
rate approval K-Approval mechanism varies with the Mallows noise parameter φ, the number of
candidates M , and the number of winners W . Recall that the Mallows model is asymptotically
design invariant, so different mechanisms only differ in how quickly they learn the asymptotic
outcome.
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In Figure 1a, the goal is to select W = 1 winner, and φ and M are varied. With low noise,
φ / .5, it is rate optimal to use 1-Approval, i.e., ask each voter to select their favorite candidate,
regardless of how many candidates there are. However, with higher noise φ, as the number of
candidates in the election increases, so does the K in the optimal K-Approval mechanism. For
φ = .999,M = 50, for example, it is best to ask each voter to select their favorite 25 candidates,
even if the task is to identify the single best candidate according to the reference distribution σ∗.
Similarly, Figure 1b shows how the rate optimal K-Approval mechanism changes with the
number of winners desired and the noise parameter, fixing the number of candidates at M = 50.
Again with high noise, it is best to ask voters to identify their favorite half of candidates, regardless
of how many winners need to be identified. With low noise, however, W -Approval is optimal to
select W winners.
Overall, the analysis suggests that with higher noise in the voter model, one should tend toward
asking voters to rank their favorite half of candidates, regardless of M and W .
The high-noise setting may seem unrealistic; however, as we will see in the next section, which
K-Approval mechanism is rate optimal in practice often scales like the high noise settings, consistent
with the idea that voting distributions in practice do not look like they are drawn from a low-noise
Mallows model. We now turn to such empirical analyses.
6 Empirics and PB deployments
We now apply our insights to practice. We focus on K-Approval voting, as opposed to general
scoring rules. This section is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we describe our data sources.
We validate our model in Section 6.2; first, we demonstrate that large deviation rates effectively
describe how quickly various mechanisms learn; next, we show that in practice voter noise models
are approximately design invariant. In Section 6.3, we show that the insights from Section 5.2
regarding optimal approval mechanisms extend to practice. Finally in Section 6.4 we note that
we find many examples in practice where randomizing between K-Approval mechanisms improves
learning.
6.1 Data description
We leverage two data sources (detailed dataset information is in Appendix Table 1). First, we have
partnered with dozens of local governments to help run participatory budgeting (PB) elections in
the last five years. These elections have used a variety of methods, primarily K-Approval; our data
in this work comes from 5 elections where K-Ranking was used, including 3 recent elections where
K = 10. This data is particularly useful as PB is among the most common types of elections with
many candidates and several winners, with several theoretical analyses (Goel et al., 2016; Garg et
al., 2019; Freeman et al., 2019).
Second, we use data available on PrefLib (Mattei and Walsh, 2013; O’Neill, 2013; Regenwetter
et al., 2007, 2008; Popov, Popova, and Regenwetter, 2014), limiting ourselves to 28 elections with
at least 5 candidates and 700 voters who provided full rankings. This ranking data spans many
domains, from people’s sushi preferences to Glasgow City Council elections. This domain breadth
supports the broad applicability of the design insights explored in this section.
We focus on ranking data to be able to simulate counter-factuals for the same election: with
K-Ranking data, we can simulate what would have occurred with any K ′-Approval elicitation
mechanism, for K ′ ≤ K (assuming no behavioral quirks). With approval data, on the other hand,
one cannot compare the mechanism to any other for that given election.
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(a) Boston 2016 PB election, selecting 1 winner: Av-
erage empirical bootstrapped error – i.e., fraction of
times the asymptotic winner is selected (solid lines,
left axis), compared to such errors over time im-
plied by the (empirically calculated) learning rates
– i.e., e−rN (dashed lines, right axis). The right axis
is a vertically shifted (in log scale) version of the
left axis, reflecting that the learning rate errors are
asymptotically valid up to polynomial factors. All
mechanisms return the same winner when all votes
are counted. “Borda” is the Borda count for the 4
candidates ranked, and all others are assumed to be
tied at rank 5 for each voter.
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(b) Approximate design invariance across elections.
For the task of selecting W = 4 winners, this plot
shows the average overlap in the top 4 candidates
identified by different mechanisms across all the elec-
tions in our dataset, if all voters with complete rank-
ings are counted. For example, of the top 4 candi-
dates identified by 1-Approval across elections, 92%
are also identified as top 4 candidates by 2-Approval.
For eachK-Approval mechanism, we include all elec-
tions where there were at least K + 1 candidates.
Figure 2: Validating model: comparing learning rates to empirical error, and showing approximate
design invariance.
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One challenge is that ranking many candidates is onerous, and so voters rank at most 14
candidates in our dataset. For the data we use from on PrefLib, full rankings (rankings up to the
number of candidates) are available. In the PB elections in our partner cities, typically each voter
ranks or selects her favorite K M candidates.
6.2 Model validation
Our model and design approach has two components that must be validated: (1) that learning
rates can effectively be used to compare different mechanisms, and (2) that design invariance
(approximately) holds in practice.
Large deviation rates as effective proxies for learning. We now confirm that, for a given
election, empirically calculated large deviation learning rates are effective proxies for the rate at
which the error in recovering the asymptotic output decreases as the number of voters increases
(even though large deviation learning rates are only asymptotically valid in the number of voters).
As examples, we first identify three elections and goals for which many of the potential K-Approval
mechanisms return exactly the same asymptotic outcome. Then, we bootstrap voters from the
available data of voters and empirically calculate the errors made in identifying the winning set of
candidates. We further calculate the large deviation learning rates for these mechanisms, using F
implied by the voting data and the formula in Proposition 4.2
Figure 2a shows the resulting errors over time for one such election where 4-Rankings are
available. We further plot e−rN for each mechanism, i.e., the error over time implied by the
learning rate (up to polynomial factors). This plot, along with Appendix Figure 3, yields several
insights:
(1) The mechanism matters: when selecting 1 winner from the election in Figure 2a after 400
votes, there is 20% chance of not picking the ultimate winner if 1-Approval is used. With 2
or 3-Approval, this number is 0.1%. The winner appears often in a voter’s top two or three
positions (but not necessarily first), while the ultimate second place candidate often falls
outside the top three. Scoring rules that reward top three placements thus perform well.
(2) The learning rates effectively capture the behavior of the empirical error: both comparatively
across mechanisms, as well as the asymptotic rate (slope of the line in log scale). This property
enables use of large deviation learning rates as proxies for learning even in elections with a
small number of voters.
(3) Ranking K candidates rather than selecting K candidates is more onerous for voters. How-
ever, it does not always provide more information in terms of learning rates, as in the examples
in Appendix Figure 3.
Design invariance in practice. Design invariance does not strictly hold in any election in our
dataset (as expected as the condition is strong). However, it approximately holds. Similar mech-
anisms produce the same asymptotic outcome for many tasks. Figure 2b shows, for example, the
average overlap across elections in the top 4 candidates identified by each mechanism. (Appendix
Figure 4 shows the same plot for the top 1 and 3 candidates, as well as the average Kendall’s τ
rank correlation between the full rankings identified by different mechanisms). Furthermore, we
find many elections and goals where most mechanisms return the same asymptotic answer, as in
the elections we leverage for the plots showing learning rates are effective proxies. This relative
2Given an empirical Fˆ , learning rates can be numerically calculated: the infz[·] is a convex minimization problem.
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consistency, especially for similar mechanisms, enables us to compare different mechanisms by their
learning rates.
6.3 K-Approval for selecting W winners
In Section 5.2, we showed for the Mallows model how the rate optimal K-Approval mechanism
changes with the noise parameter φ, the number of candidates, and the number of winners. We
now show this scaling in practice.
For every election in our dataset, we find the Approval rate optimal mechanism (among K we
can simulate) for every goal of selecting W winners, for 1 ≤ W ≤ M . We then run a regression
across all the elections for which K is rate optimal, versus the number of winners desired and the
number of candidates; see Table 2 in the Appendix for the regression table. While there is some
variation across elections, the number of candidates and winners proves a reasonable metric across
elections for the rate approval K-Approval mechanism (R2 ≈ .27).
The regression confirms the idea that in practice, one should regularize toward asking voters to
choose their favorite half the candidates. For picking a small subset of winners W ≈ 4 out of more
than 10 candidates, for example, one should ask voters to provide their favorite K ≈ 6 candidates,
with K > W . This suggestion directly counters common practice. In the PB elections that we have
helped run, for example, 4 or 5-Approval is most typical, even though ultimately 6-10 projects may
be funded (out of ≈ 15-20).
Then, in Figure 5 in the Appendix, we plot the line induced from the regression coefficients
with the Mallows rate optimal lines, for M ≤ 10 candidates. Comparing to the rate optimal
mechanisms for the Mallows model with various φ (within the candidate range for which we have
empirical data), we find that empirical data behaves most closely to a Mallows model with noise
parameter φ ∈ [.8, .9]. (We are not claiming that empirical data is drawn from a Mallows model; it
most certainly is not, with factors such as polarizing projects important in practice). This coarse
comparison provides an approximate expected scaling behavior for elections with many candidates.
6.4 Randomization in practice
We find 16 examples in which randomizing between two K-Approval mechanisms leads to faster
learning than using either mechanism separately, including 8 examples where such randomization
beats the Approval rate optimal mechanism. Table 3 in the Appendix contains details.
7 Discussion
We show that in elections with many candidates, the elicitation mechanism and corresponding
scoring rule used affect how quickly the final outcome is learned. The learning speed differential
between mechanisms can be the difference between identifying the ultimate winner with only a 80%
probability or a 99.9% probability after 400 voters, for example. We then provide design decisions
that emerge when our framework is applied to data from real elections. When using K-Approval
to select a small number of W winners, for example, it is often better to ask voters to identify their
favorite K > W candidates. The insights from this work should be applicable in a variety of such
settings, from elections to crowdsourcing labeling tasks.
There are several important, open research avenues. Most importantly, in real elections maxi-
mizing the rate at which the final outcome is identified is not the only goal, and future work should
seek to balance such multiple objectives.
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For example, there may be axiomatic reasons to prefer one elicitation mechanism over another,
e.g., that the final outcome corresponds to the candidate(s) that the most voters indicate is their
first choice. Another objective may be to minimize the cognitive load imposed on voters. Asking
voters to provide a full ranking over the candidates and then using a rate-optimal scoring rule
trivially provides faster learning than any other mechanism. However, asking voters to rank 20
candidates is prohibitive in many settings. Future empirical work, in line with that of Benade et
al. (2018) and Gelauff et al. (2018), should study the cognitive load various mechanisms impose on
voters, to better understand the trade-off between the objectives.
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(a) Boston 2016, selecting 4 winners.
0 200 400 600 800
Voters
10−1
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
E
rr
or
Mechanism
1-Approval
2-Approval
4-Approval
6-Approval
7-Approval
Borda
100
L
ea
rn
in
g
ra
te
p
re
d
ic
te
d
E
rr
or
(b) Durham Ward 1, selecting 4 winners. K-
Approval for K ∈ {1, . . . , 7} and the Borda rule all
have the same asymptotic winners, but we omit sev-
eral mechanisms from the plot for visualization ease.
Figure 3: Average bootstrapped error (fraction of winning subset not identified) by the number of
voters, compared to the errors implied by the (empirically calculated) learning rates. All mecha-
nisms plotted have the same asymptotic winners.
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Name Candidates Votes with complete rankings K-Ranking available
Participatory Budgeting
Boston, 2016 8 4173 4
Durham Ward 1, 2019 21 1637 10
Durham Ward 2, 2019 10 329 10
Durham Ward 3, 2019 12 694 10
Rochester, 2019 22 649 5
PrefLib:
Irish01 12 4259 12
Irish02 9 4810 9
Irish03 14 3166 14
ElectorialReformSociety77 12 1312 12
ElectorialReformSociety13 5 1809 5
Sushi10 10 5000 10
Glasgow05 10 718 10
Glasgow17 9 962 9
Glasgow10 9 818 9
Glasgow18 9 767 9
Glasgow20 9 726 9
Glasgow14 8 1071 8
Glasgow12 8 1040 8
Burlington01 6 2603 6
Burlington02 6 2853 6
APA03 5 11539 5
APA01 5 10978 5
APA11 5 10791 5
APA05 5 10655 5
APA02 5 10623 5
APA04 5 10519 5
APA09 5 10211 5
APA06 5 10177 5
APA07 5 9747 5
APA12 5 9091 5
APA08 5 8532 5
APA10 5 8467 5
Aspen02 5 1183 5
Table 1: List of election data that we use in Section 6. From PrefLib, we use all elections where
full rankings are available and there are at least 5 candidates and 700 voters. Throughout,
we ignore voters who did not submit full rankings (especially with high K-Ranking requested,
this might only be a fraction of the total number of actual votes). Additionally, for the PB
elections, we limit the data to those who submitted votes online rather than through paper ballots.
Sources for the PrefLib datasets are: (Mattei and Walsh, 2013; O’Neill, 2013; Regenwetter
et al., 2007, 2008; Popov, Popova, and Regenwetter, 2014).
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(a) Task of selecting W = 1 winners.
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(b) Task of selecting W = 3 winners.
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(c) Task of ranking all candidates. The values plot-
ted are the average Kendall’s τ rank correlation be-
tween resulting rankings.
Figure 4: More approximate design invariance plots
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Dep. Variable: Best Mechanism R-squared: 0.273
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.264
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 42.68
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 Prob (F-statistic): 2.72e-11
Time: 16:17:32 Log-Likelihood: -531.30
No. Observations: 241 AIC: 1071.
Df Residuals: 237 BIC: 1085.
Df Model: 3
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept -0.1687 0.411 -0.411 0.681 -0.973 0.636
Number Winners 0.9133 0.126 7.229 0.000 0.666 1.161
Number Candidates 0.2662 0.057 4.630 0.000 0.154 0.379
Number Winners:Number Candidates -0.0446 0.008 -5.786 0.000 -0.060 -0.030
Omnibus: 8.524 Durbin-Watson: 1.693
Prob(Omnibus): 0.014 Jarque-Bera (JB): 8.414
Skew: 0.417 Prob(JB): 0.0149
Kurtosis: 2.624 Cond. No. 463.
Table 2: OLS Regression on the best K to use in K-Approval, by the number of candidates and
desired winners. Standard errors are cluster standard errors, where each cluster is an election in
our dataset.
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(a) For selecting W = 1 winner as number of candidates vary.
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(b) For M = 10 candidates as number of win-
ners vary.
Figure 5: K-Approval rate optimal mechanism for the Mallows model as φ, number of candidates,
and number of winners vary. This plot contains an empirical line, which is calculated using the
coefficients in the regression contained in Table 2.
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Election Number Winners Mechanism 1 Mechanism 2 Beats Approval rate optimal
Durham Ward 1, 2019 2 3 4 True
Durham Ward 1, 2019 13 8 9 True
Durham Ward 1, 2019 17 6 7 True
Irish03 1 1 3 False
Irish03 10 8 9 False
Irish03 10 8 10 False
Irish01 5 3 4 True
Irish01 5 3 5 False
Irish01 5 3 11 False
Irish01 7 1 5 False
Glasgow05 2 4 5 True
Glasgow05 2 5 6 True
Glasgow10 2 3 4 False
Glasgow10 2 4 6 False
Glasgow10 2 5 6 True
APA08 2 2 3 True
Table 3: Elections and goals where randomizing between two K-Approval mechanisms produces
leads to faster learning than using either of the mechanisms separately. For several of these cases,
randomization also beats the Approval rate optimal mechanism.
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B Proofs
B.1 Asymptotic design-invariance
Proposition 1. A setting (M,F ) for goal G is asymptotically design-invariant if and only if there
exist candidate tiers O∗ = {C∗1 . . . C∗T } (corresponding to G) s.t. ∀s < t: i ∈ C∗s , j ∈ C∗t =⇒
PrF (σv(i) ≤ k) > PrF (σv(j) ≤ k), ∀k ∈ {1 . . .M − 1}.
Proof.
∀i ∈ C : E[siv] =
M∑
m=1
β(m)PrF (σv(i) = m)
=
M∑
m=1
β(m)PrF (σv(i) ≤ m)−
M∑
m=2
β(m)PrF (σv(i) < m)
=
M∑
m=1
β(m)PrF (σv(i) ≤ m)−
M−1∑
m=1
β(m+ 1)PrF (σv(i) ≤ m)
= β(M) +
M−1∑
m=1
[β(m)− β(m+ 1)] PrF (σv(i) ≤ m)
=⇒ . By the definition of asymptotically design-invariant,
∃O∗ : ∀β ∈ B, lim
N→∞
O(M,N,F, β,G) = O∗, with probability 1
For this O∗ = {C∗1 , . . . , C∗T }, we show by contradiction that ∀s < t: i ∈ C∗s , j ∈ C∗t =⇒
PrF (σv(i) ≤ k) > PrF (σv(j) ≤ k), ∀k ∈ {1 . . .M − 1}: Suppose ∃i ∈ C∗s , j ∈ C∗t , s < t, k ∈
{1 . . .M − 1} such that PrF (σv(i) ≤ k) ≤ PrF (σv(j) ≤ k). Then, let
β(m) =
{
1 m ≤ k
0 m > k
Then, E[siv] = β(M) + β(k)PrF (σv(i) ≤ k) ≤ E[sjv]. Then, with positive probability,
lim
N→∞
O(M,N,F, β,G) 6= O∗
.
⇐= . Suppose there exists such a O∗. Then, ∀β ∈ B = {β : ∀k < ` ∈ 1 . . .M, β(k) ≥
β(`), and ∃k < `, β(k) > β(`)}: Suppose i ∈ C∗s , j ∈ C∗t , s < t:
E[siv] = β(M) +
M−1∑
m=1
[β(m)− β(m+ 1)] PrF (σv(i) ≤ m)
> E[sjv]
Where the strict inequality follows as ∃m : β(m) − β(m + 1) > 0. Then, for all candidates
i ∈ C∗s , j ∈ C∗t , s < t, by the strong law of large numbers limN→∞ sNi > limN→∞ sNj w.p. 1. Thus,
limN→∞O(M,N,F, β,G) = O∗ w.p. 1.
Remark 1. The following example, with candidates A,B,C,D leads to a disjoint set of 2 winners
with 1-Approval and 2 approval, respectively
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Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5
Rank 1 A A D D B
Rank 2 B B C C C
Rank 3 C C B B D
Rank 4 D D A A A
With 1-Approval, candidates A,D are selected. With 2-Approval, B,C are selected.
B.2 Learning rates
Notation.
tiij(K) is the probability that i is approved but j is not, using K-Approval.
For convenience, we overload the rate function r(·):
• rij(β) is as defined in Proposition 2, the large deviation rate to learn a pair of candidates i, j
given scoring rule β, for a fixed F that should be clear from context. When a goal G is clear
from context, r(β) is as defined in Proposition 4, the minimum over rij(β) for candidate pairs
that are in different asymptotic tiers.
• rij(K) is as defined in Proposition 3, the large deviation rate to learn a pair of candidates i, j
using K-Approval. r(K) is analogous to the previous item when using K approval.
• r(a, b) is the large deviation rate to learn a pair of candidates i, j using approval voting when
the probability that i is approved but j is not is a; and b is the probability that j is approved
but i is not is not.
When which rate function we mean is clear from context, we may drop the argument (·) and just
write rij or r.
Remark 2. r(a, b) > r(c, d) when a > c, b ≤ d, OR a ≥ c, b < d.
Proof. γ(a, b) =
√
ab+ 1− a− b is strictly concave in a, b, with maximum at a = b. Thus, holding
either a or b constant and moving the other farther away strictly decreases γ, and thus strictly
increases r.
Proposition 2. Fix scoring rule β ∈ B, voter distribution F , and consider candidates i, j such
that si > sj. Then, the probability of making a mistake in ranking these two candidates after N
voters, Pr(σN (i) > σN (j)), goes to zero with large deviation rate
rij(β) = − inf
z∈R
logEF [exp (z (β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))))]
Further, the following upper bound holds for any N .
Pr(σN (i) > σN (j)) ≤ exp(−rij(β)N)
Proof. Define the following random variable for each voter v ∼ F :
Av = β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))
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Then, σN (i) < σN (j) when AN =
∑N
v=1Av > 0, and E[Av] > 0 by supposition. Let
rij(β) = − inf
z∈R
Λ(z)
Λ(z) = log
 M∑
m=1
∑
6`=m
Pr(σv(i) = m,σv(j) = `) exp[z(β(σv(i))− β(σv(j)))]

Then, by basic large deviation bounds (see, e.g. Dembo and Zeitouni (2010)):
− lim
N→∞
1
N
log Pr(AN ≤ 0) = rij(β)
And, applying Chernoff bounds, we get the standard relationship to the large deviation rate,
giving an upper bound for the probability of error directly, including any polynomial factors out
front:
Pr(σN (i) > σN (j)) ≤ Pr(AN ≤ 0)
<
[
inf
z>0
E[exp[−zAv]]
]N
=
 inf
z<0
 M∑
m=1
∑
6`=m
Pr(σv(i) = m,σv(j) = `) exp[z(β(σv(i))− β(σv(j)))]
N
=
[
inf
z<0
exp[Λ(z)]
]N
= exp[−rij(β)N ]
Then, Pr(σN (i) < σN (j)) > 1−  when
exp[−rijN ] < 
⇐⇒ N > 1
rij
log
(
1

)
Proposition 3. Consider β consistent with K-Approval voting for some fixed K, and candidates
i, j such that si > sj. Then the large deviation rate rij(β) in Proposition 2 is
rij(K) = − log
(
2
√
tiij(K)t
j
ij(K) + 1− tiij(K)− tjij(K)
)
Where tiij(K) , PrF (σv(i) ≤ K,σv(j) > K), i.e., the probability that a voter approves i but not j.
Proof. With K-approval voting, Aijv becomes
Av =

1 w.p. tiij , i.e., when candidate i approved but j not approved
0 w.p. 1− tiij − tjij , i.e., when both approved, or neither approved
−1 w.p. tjij , i.e., when candidate j approved but i not approved
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Then,
rij = − inf
z∈R
Λ(z)
Λ(z) = log
 M∑
m=1
∑
` 6=m
Pr(σv(i) = m,σv(j) = `) exp[z(β(σv(i))− β(σv(j)))]

= log
[
tiij exp(z) + t
j
ij exp(−z) + (1− tiij − tjij)
]
The inf(Λ) is attained at z = 12 log
tjij
tiij
(Λ is convex in z, and so setting the first derivative to zero
finds the inf). And so
rij = − log
[
tiij exp
(
1
2
log
tjij
tiij
)
+ tjij exp
(
−1
2
log
tjij
tiij
)
+ (1− tiij − tjij)
]
= − log
[
2
√
tiijt
j
ij + 1− tiij − tjij
]
Proposition 4. Consider goal G and β ∈ B such that ON → O∗. Let QN be the expected number
of errors in the outcome after N voters,
∑
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t Pr(σ
N (i) > σN (j)). Then QN goes to zero
with large deviation rate
r(β) = min
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
rij(β)
Further, the following upper bound holds for any N .
QN ≤M2 exp(−rN)
Proof. By the Union bound
QN =
∑
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
Pr(σN (i) > σN (j))
≤
∑
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
exp[−rijN ] Proposition 2
≤M2 exp[−rN ]
Now, using large deviation properties:
By supposition, QN → 0, and so −QN approaches 0 from below. Then,
− lim
N→∞
1
N
log(QN ) = − lim
N→∞
1
N
log
∑
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
Pr(σN (i) > σN (j))
= − max
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
(
lim
N→∞
1
N
log Pr(σN (i) > σN (j))
)
(1)
= min
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
−
(
lim
N→∞
1
N
log Pr(σN (i) > σN (j))
)
= min
i∈C∗s ,j∈C∗t ,s<t
rij = r
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Line (1) follows from: ∀ai ≥ 0, lim sup→0
[
 log
(∑N
i a

i
)]
= maxNi lim sup→0 log(a

i). See,
e.g., Lemma 1.2.15 in (Dembo and Zeitouni, 2010) for a proof of this property.
Thus r is the large deviation rate for QN .
B.3 Design insights
Theorem 1. Randomization does not improve the outcome learning rate for any asymptotically
design-invariant noise model F or goal G. For any randomized scoring rule mechanism (B,D),
where B ⊂ B, for any F , G, the scoring rule β∗(k) = ∑p dpβp(k) satisfies r(β∗) ≥ r(B,D).
Proof. From Proposition 2, for a given scoring rule β and pair of candidates i, j, the learning rate
is
rij(β) = − inf
z∈R
logEF [exp [z [β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))]]]
= − log inf
z∈R
EF [exp [z [β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))]]]
Similarly, if we use scoring rules {βu}Pu=1, each with probability du, then,
rij({βu}Pu=1) = − log inf
z∈R
EF,{du,βu} [exp [z [βu(σv(i))− βu(σv(j))]]]
= − log inf
z∈R
∑
u
duEF [exp [z [βu(σv(i))− βu(σv(j))]]]
Now, for a single scoring rule β(·), let
γ(β(1), . . . , β(M)) , EF [exp [z [β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))]]]
Below, we show that γ(β(1), . . . , β(M)) is convex in β(k),∀k, z. Then, by convexity, ∀z
P∑
u=1
duγ(βu(1), . . . , βu(M)) ≥ γ
(
P∑
u=1
duβu(1), . . . ,
P∑
u=1
duβu(M)
)
and so
inf
z
[
P∑
u=1
duγ(βu(1), . . . , βu(M))
]
≥ inf
z
γ
(
P∑
u=1
duβu(1), . . . ,
P∑
u=1
duβu(M)
)
The left hand side is equal to the argument inside the − log(·) for the rate function for ran-
domizing between scoring rules {βu}Pu=1, each with probability du, and the right hand side is the
argument inside for the rate function for instead using the single scoring rule β∗ defined as the
convex combination of {βu}Pu=1. Then, as − log(x) is decreasing in x, we have that
rij(β
∗) ≥ rij({βu}Pu=1)
.
As this holds for each pair of candidates i, j simultaneously, we are done.
Proof that γ(β(1), . . . , β(M)) , EF [exp [z [β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))]]] is convex in β(k), ∀k.
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We directly calculate the Hessian of γ and note that it is diagonally dominant and thus positive
semidefinite. For notational convenience, we let βk = β(k), and σ(k, `) = PrF (σv(i) = k, σv(j) = `).
Of course, σ(k, k) = 0, as we assume each voter has a strict ranking as her preference.
γ(β1, . . . , βM ) = EF [exp [z [β(σv(i))− β(σv(j))]]]
=
M∑
k=1
M∑
`=1
σ(k, `) exp [z [βk − β`]]
∂
∂βk
γ(β1, . . . , βM ) = z exp [zβk]
∑
6`=k
exp [−zβ`]σ(k, `)− z exp [−zβk]
∑
`6=k
exp [zβ`]σ(`, k)
∂2
∂ (βk)
2γ(β1, . . . , βM ) = z
2 exp [zβk]
∑
6`=k
exp [−zβ`]σ(k, `) + z2 exp [−zβk]
∑
` 6=k
exp [zβ`]σ(`, k)
= z2
exp [zβk]∑
`6=k
exp [−zβ`]σ(k, `)
+
exp [−zβk]∑
`6=k
exp [zβ`]σ(`, k)

∂2
∂βkβ`
γ(β1, . . . , βM ) = −z2 [exp [zβk] exp [−zβ`]σ(k, `) + exp [−zβk] exp [zβ`]σ(`, k)]
Thus, the Hessian of γ is diagonally dominant with non-negative diagonal elements: ∀k,∣∣∣∣ ∂2γ∂ (βk)2
∣∣∣∣ ≥∑
`6=k
∣∣∣∣ ∂2γ∂βkβ`
∣∣∣∣
and so the Hessian is positive semi-definite. Thus, γ is convex in βk.
Theorem 2. Randomization amongst K-Approval mechanisms does not improve the learning rate
for separating a given pair of candidates i, j for any asymptotically design-invariant noise model
F or goal G. For any randomized K-Approval mechanism (B,D), where βp ∈ B corresponds to
p-Approval, for any F , G, there exists a mechanism K∗ij-Approval such that rij(K
∗
ij) ≥ rij(B,D).
Proof. From Proposition 3, for k-Approval,
rij(t
i
ij , t
j
ij) = − log
[
2
√
tiijt
j
ij + 1− tiij − tjij
]
Where tiij is the probability that i is approved but j is not.
This rate function is convex in tiij , t
j
ij :
• rij(a, b) = h(g(a, b)), where h(x) = − log(x), g(a, b) = 2
√
ab+ 1− a− b.
• g(a, b) is concave in a, b
• h is convex, and h˜ is non-increasing, where h˜(x) =
{
h(x) x > 0
∞ x ≤ 0 is the extended value
function of h.
• By convex composition rules, rij(a, b) is convex (see, e.g., page 84 of Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004)).
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The result follows by convexity. Consider a randomization of K-Approval mechanisms for
K ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}, where K-Approval is used with probability dK .
The resulting approval probabilities are: tiij =
∑M−1
K=1 d
Ktiij(K), t
j
ij =
∑M−1
K=1 d
Ktjij(K). By
convexity:
r
(
M−1∑
K=1
dKtiij(K),
M−1∑
K=1
dKtjij(K)
)
≤
M−1∑
K=1
dKr
(
tiij(K), t
j
ij(K)
)
=
M−1∑
K=1
dKrij(K)
≤ max
K
rij(K)
We note that, unlike the previous proof, we cannot conclude in general that randomization
cannot improve the rates at which the outcome is learned (in fact, Theorem 3 establishes otherwise).
That is because while the same β∗ could be said to be rate optimal (compared to the randomized
mechanism) for every pair of candidates simultaneously in that proof, in this proof arg maxK rij(K)
may change based on the pair i, j.
Corollary 1. Randomization among K-Approval mechanisms does not improve the learning rate
for selecting W winners from the Mallows model. For any randomized K-Approval mechanism
(B,D), where βp ∈ B corresponds to p-Approval, for selecting W winners from the Mallows model,
there exists an Approval rate optimal mechanism K∗-Approval such that r(K∗) ≥ r(B,D).
Proof. When selecting W winners out of M candidates, we need to separate candidates 1 . . .W
from candidates W +1 . . .M . It is easy to show that the pivotal pair, regardless of which K is used
in K-Approval, is W ,W + 1. Applying Theorem 2, then, randomization cannot help the overall
rate.
Theorem 4. Under the Mallows model and the goal of selecting W winners, W -Approval may not
be Approval rate optimal.
Proof. We prove the result by providing an example where it is not optimal. Suppose there are 4
candidates, and we wish to select 3 winners, i.e., separate the first three items from the last item.
Let the items in the reference ranking be, in order, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively.
A Mallows model (with parameter φ = p1−p , where p is the probability of flipping a given pair of
candidates) can be sampled by repeated insertion (Lu and Boutilier, 2014; Diaconis, 1988): starting
from the first item in the reference ranking, there exists probability p˜ij =
φi−j
1+φ1+···+φi−1 at which
item i can be inserted into position j ≤ i, independently of how items above it were inserted, such
that the resulting ranking distribution matches the Mallows model.
Using this repeated insertion property for our example, we can derive p`k, the probability at
which item 3 is in position ` and item 4 is in position k after sampling from a Mallows model with
parameter φ.
In particular, if ` < k, p`k is exactly the probability that item 3 is inserted in position ` and item
4 is inserted in position k. If k > `, however, it is the probability that item 3 is inserted in position
`−1 and then pushed down when item 4 is inserted in position k. (More generally, it turns out, the
exact probability for an item appearing in a given position in the Mallows model can be calculated
using a simple dynamic program, a fact that does not appear to be documented elsewhere but may
be independently useful. We used this dynamic program to find this given example).
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Then, for our example
Ni , 1 + φ1 + · · ·+ φi−1
p`k =

0 φ
2
N3
φ2
N4
φ2
N3
φ1
N4
φ2
N3
φ0
N4
φ2
N3
φ3
N4
0 φ
1
N3
φ1
N4
φ1
N3
φ0
N4
φ1
N3
φ3
N4
φ1
N3
φ2
N4
0 φ
0
N3
φ0
N4
φ0
N3
φ3
N4
φ0
N3
φ2
N4
φ0
N3
φ1
N4
0

`k
=
1
N3N4

0 φ4 φ3 φ2
φ5 0 φ2 φ1
φ4 φ3 0 1
φ3 φ2 φ1 0

`k
Recall that tiij(K) is the probability that i is approved but j is not, using K-Approval. Then,
if we use 3-approval and 2-approval, respectively:
N3 = 1 + φ+ φ
2
N4 = 1 + φ+ φ
2 + φ3
t334(3) = p14 + p24 + p34 =
φ2 + φ1 + 1
N3N4
=
1
N4
t434(3) = p41 + p42 + p43 =
φ3 + φ2 + φ1
N3N4
=
φ
N4
t334(2) = p14 + p24 + p13 + p23 =
φ2 + φ1 + φ3 + φ2
N3N4
t434(2) = p41 + p42 + p31 + p32 =
φ3 + φ2 + φ4 + φ3
N3N4
Then, recall the rate between items i, j using K approval is
rij(K) = − log
[
2
√
tiij(K)t
j
ij(K) + 1− tiij(K)− tjij(K)
]
r34(3) = − log
[
2
√
1
N4
φ
N4
+ 1− 1
N4
− φ
N4
]
r34(2) = − log
2√φ2 + φ1 + φ3 + φ2
N3N4
φ3 + φ2 + φ4 + φ3
N3N4
+ 1− φ
2 + φ1 + φ3 + φ2
N3N4
− φ
3 + φ2 + φ4 + φ3
N3N4

When there is low noise, e.g., φ = .1 (p = .091):
r34(3) = .5462
r34(2) = .04696 < r34(3)
But when there is high noise, e.g., φ = .8 (p = .44):
r34(3) = .00378
r34(2) = .00402 > r34(3)
Note that the same example works for selecting 1 winner out of the 4 candidates, as the repeated
insertion model can be run in reverse.
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Theorem 3. Randomization among K-Approval mechanisms may improve the learning rate for
the goal of selecting W winners. There exist asymptotically design-invariant settings (M,F ) for the
goal of selecting W winners such that a randomized K-Approval mechanism (B,D), where βp ∈ B
corresponds to p-Approval, satisfies
r(B,D) > max
K
r(K)
Proof. We provide two proofs: a numeric example from a real-world election, and a contrived,
constructed example.
Numeric example found in a real election. In Durham Ward 1, to select 2 winners, ran-
domizing between 3 and 4-Approval is better than either individually, even though asymptotically
the mechanisms pick the same set of winners. The critical pair with 2-Approval is with the can-
didate asymptotically ranked 1st, and the best item not selected. With 3-Approval, it is with the
candidate asymptotically ranked 2nd, and the same best item not selected.
We will call these items h, i, j (the one not selected) respectively. The respective probabilities
of being selected alone:
thhj(3) = 0.277
thhj(4) = 0.266
tjhj(3) = 0.200
tjhj(4) = 0.188
tiij(3) = 0.255
tiij(4) = 0.295
tjij(3) = 0.160
tjij(4) = 0.217
thhj({3, 4}) = 0.271
tjhj({3, 4}) = 0.194
tiij({3, 4}) = 0.275
tjij({3, 4}) = 0.189
And the resulting rates (using the formula in Proposition 3) are:
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rhj(3) = .00616932
rij(3) = .01114061
rhj(4) = .00677352
rij(4) = .00592327
rhj({3, 4}) = .00642839
rij({3, 4}) = .00815633
r(3) = min(rhj(3), rij(3)) = .00616932
r(4) = min(rhj(4), rij(4)) = .00592327
r({3, 4}) = min(rhj({3, 4}), rij({3, 4})) = .00642839 > max(r(3), r(4))
Thus randomization improves learning.
Constructed example with design invariance. We now construct a fully design-invariant
example with the same flavor as the numeric example, where which pair is critical changes with
the mechanism.
Consider three candidates h, i, j, such that h is asymptotically in the set of W winners and i, j
are not. Thus, we need the rates at which h is separated from both i, j. Let W = K < L = K + 1.
We prove the result by giving an example where: it is easier to separate h from i using K-
Approval, and easier to separate h from j using L-Approval. Using K-Approval, rhj asymptotically
dominates the rate at which the overall outcome is learned, and using L-Approval, rhi does. Further,
randomizing between the two mechanisms improves the two rates that dominate enough such that
the overall rate is improved.
We need to show the following hold for our example: one of the rates between candidates h and
i, j are smaller than other rates, i.e., dominate the overall learning rate when K and/or L approval
is used; randomization between K and L approval helps the minimum rate between candidates h
and i, j; K ′-Approval (K ′ 6= K,K ′ 6= L) produces a worse rate than either K or L approval; and
this example is asymptotically design-invariant.
We prove each of these conditions in turn after specifying the example.
Recall that tiij(k) is the probability that i is approved but j is not, using k-Approval. Here, we
will use:
tihi(K), t
i
hi(L), t
h
hi(K), t
h
hi(L), t
j
hj(K), t
j
hj(L), t
h
hj(K), t
h
hj(L)
. The end row labeled “Total value” then sums up these values.
Example Specification. Consider F such according to the following table, where the first
column is the probabilities of the positions in the second set of columns. The third set of columns
indicates whether those set of positions contribute to the given probabilities, for easy accounting.
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Positions of h, i, j Contributes to? (Y = Yes)
Row PrF (·) σ(h) σ(i) σ(j) thhi(K) tihi(K) thhi(L) tihi(L) thhj(K) tjhj(K) thhj(L) tjhj(L)
1 a K L+ 1 L Y Y Y
2 a K − 1 K L Y
3 T1 − a−  K L+ 1 L+ 2 Y Y Y Y
4 T2 − 2a L+ 1 L+ 2 K Y Y
5 T2 − 2a L+ 1 K L+ 2 Y Y
6 a L+ 1 K L Y Y Y
7 a L K − 1 K Y Y
8 a L L+ 1 L+ 2 Y Y
9 a L+ 1 L+ 2 L Y
10  See caption Y Y Y Y
11 0 Otherwise
Total value: T1 T2 T1 + a T2 − a T1 + a T2 − a T1 T2
Table 4: Where the constants such that 0 <  < a < T22 < T2 < T1 < T1 + 2T2 + a = 1, i.e., the
table describes a valid probability distribution.Row 10 is as follows: The first K candidates (the
asymptotic winners) occupy the first K spots, in an order drawn uniformly at random. Similarly,
The bottom M −K candidates occupy the bottom M −K spots, in an order drawn uniformly at
random. This randomization ensures asymptotically design invariance.
The table does not specify the probabilities of other candidates appearing in any position, so it
is possible that they dominate the learning rate (are hardest to learn). (In particular, if the same,
asymptotically non-winning candidate q is always in position L in the case in row 3, then it may
be hard to separate it from candidate h using L approval). However, we can specify the example
further to ensure this does not happen.
Suppose candidates are indexed by their order in some strict ranking σ∗. Then, candidates
h = K, i = L = K + 1, j = K + 2. Further suppose that candidates in {1 . . .K − 1} always occupy,
in order except in case of row 10, the best positions in a voter’s ranking that are not reserved for
candidates h, i, j in the table above.
For candidates q ∈ {K + 3 . . .M}, we have to be more careful to avoid the case in parenthesis
above. Suppose these Q = M −K + 2 candidates fill up the bottom spots in a voter’s ranking in
a uniform at random order. In other words, they occupy spots L + 3 . . .M , and the worst spot
among whichever of K,L,L+ 1, L+ 2 is missing in each row in the table above.
Rates between the h and i, j dominate the overall learning rate using K or L approval.
We are now ready to show the first claim that learning between candidates h and i, j is hardest
(when using either K or L approval).
By the specification above, candidates in {1 . . .K − 2} are always approved, and so learning
between those candidates and any non-winning candidate is faster than any large deviations rate.
Similarly, candidate K − 1 always is ranked higher than candidates q ∈ {K + 3 . . .M}, and it is
approved alone with high enough probability.
Then, the other candidates who may dominate the learning rate are candidate K − 1 (in sepa-
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ration from i, j), or q ∈ {K + 3 . . .M} (in separation from h). From the above table:
thhq(K) = T1 + a Rows 1,2,3,10
tqhq(K) =
2a
Q
Rows 8,9
thhq(L) =
Q− 1
Q
[T1 − ] + 3a+  Rows 1,2,7,10; and 3,8 w.p. Q− 1
Q
tqhq(L) =
2T2 − 3a
Q
Rows 4,5,9 w.p.
1
Q
tK−1(K−1)i(K) = T1 + T2 Rows 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10
ti(K−1)i(K) = 2a Rows 2, 7
tK−1(K−1)j(K) = T1 + T2 + a Rows 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10
tj(K−1)j(K) = a Rows 7
tK−1(K−1)i(L) = T1 + T2 Rows 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10
ti(K−1)i(L) = 2a Rows 2, 7
tK−1(K−1)j(L) = T1 + T2 − 2a Rows 3, 5, 8, 10
tj(K−1)j(L) = 2a Rows 2, 7
Now, suppose 3a > T1Q and Q > 2. (Both conditions occur for Q large enough). Then, applying
Remark 2 regarding learning rates being larger when the arguments are farther away from one
another (holding one fixed), the resulting rates with these candidates are dominated by (larger
than) the rates between candidates h and i, j, discussed next.
Randomizing improves the minimum rate between candidates h and i, j. By Remark 2,
r(T1 + a, T2 − a) > r(T1, T2)
Using K-Approval:
Rate between h, i: rhi(K) = r(T1, T2)
Rate between h, j: rhj(K) = r(T1 + a, T2 − a)
Overall rate: r(K) = min(rhi(K), rhj(K)) = r(T1, T2)
Using L-Approval:
Rate between h, i: rhi(L) = r(T1 + a, T2 − a)
Rate between h, j: rhj(L) = r(T1, T2)
Overall rate: r(K) = min(rhi(L), rhj(L)) = r(T1, T2)
Randomizing – For any 0 < p < 1, eliciting K-Approval with probability p, and L-Approval
otherwise:
Rate between h, i: r(T1 + (1− p)a, T2 − (1− p)a)
Rate between h, j: r(T1 + pa, T2 − pa)
Overall rate: r(K) = r(T1 + φa, T2 − φa) φ = min(p, 1− p)
> r(T1, T2) Remark 2
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K ′-Approval (K ′ 6= K,K ′ 6= L) produces a worse rate than either K or L approval.
For any K ′ < K − 1, h is approved with probability 2 < , and i, j are never approved. Then,
the rate between h and i, j is − log(1− 2)→ 0 as → 0. Identically, for K ′ ≥ L+ 2 = K+ 3, both
h and i, j are approved except with some probability 2 < .
For K ′ = K − 1, h is approved without i with probability a + 2 (for some 2 < ), and i is
approved without h with probability a. Then, the rate between h and i is − log(2√(a+ 2)a+ 1−
2a− 2)→ 0 as → 0.
For K ′ = K+ 2 = L+ 1, h is approved without i with probability T2−a+ 2, and i is approved
without h with probability 0. Then, the rate between them is − log(1− T2 + a− 2). For T2 small
enough, this is a worse rate than using K or L approval.
The example described is asymptotically design-invariant. From the above table, the
probability that candidate c ∈ {1 . . .M} is in position k or better, i.e., σ(c) ≤ k is:
Candidate k < K − 1 K − 1 K L = K + 1 K + 2 K + 3 M > k > K + 3
w ∈ {1 . . .K − 2} > 0 > 1−  1 1 1 1 1
K − 1 > 0 1− 2a 1− 2a 1− 2a 1 1 1
K > 0 > a T1 + a T1 + 3a 1 1 1
L = K + 1 0 a T2 < T2 +  < 1 < 1 < 1
K + 2 0 0 T2 − a < T2 + 3a+  < 1 < 1 < 1
q ∈ {K + 3 . . .M} 0 0 2aQ T1+2T2−3a−Q < 1 < 1 < 1
Conditions on constants in problem. For the above claims to hold, we set conditions on the
constants in the problem. They are
0 <  < a <
T2
2
< T2 < T1 < T1 + 2T2 + a = 1
1−  > 2
√
T1T2 + 1− T1 − T2
T1 + 2T2 − 3a− 
Q
< T1 + 3a
3a >
T1
Q
Q > 2
1− T2 + a−  > 2
√
T1T2 + 1− T1 − T2
This is a feasible set of constraints: Q can be set large enough to meet conditions 3,4,5 for any
fixed T1, a, T2 that meet condition 1. Condition 2 is weaker than the last condition. That leaves
the last condition along with the first one.
1− T2 + a−  > 2
√
T1T2 + 1− T1 − T2
⇐⇒ a−  > 2
√
T1T2 − T1
⇐⇒ T2
2
− 2 > 2
√
T1T2 − T1 set T2
2
−  = a
⇐⇒ T2
2
+ T1 > 2+ 2
√
T1T2
which holds for T1 large enough, and T2,  small enough.
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